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inTroduCTion
This article illustrates how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) reversed its jurisprudence on adoption by single homosexual individuals, and describes the 
consequences of this decision within the French legal system.1 
The decision in E.B. v. France concerns the case of Ms. E.B., 
a French lesbian woman against whom France discriminated 
in violation of Articles 8 (right 
to respect for private and fam-
ily life) and 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). After French family 
courts and administrative agen-
cies denied her adoption appli-
cation and successive appeals on 
the grounds of her sexual orien-
tation, Ms. E.B. filed a petition 
before the ECtHR. Following 
her victory in the supranational 
court, a domestic administrative 
tribunal granted Ms. E.B. a new 
trial and allowed her to adopt a 
child – surprisingly, not based 
on human rights principles, but 
rather on a subjective assess-
ment of the life of the future 
adoptive parent.
In French law it is possible 
for unmarried people to adopt 
children. Those children can 
assume the legal status of natural children of the adoptive par-
ent.2 Ms. E.B., a single woman, applied to adopt a child under 
the French Civil Code. When she signed the application, on 
February 26, 1998, she was 37 years old. She had been a kinder-
garten teacher for thirteen years, and had been in a homosexual 
relationship with her partner for eight years. All these circum-
stances were disclosed in her adoption application. After about 
six months, Ms. E.B. received a first denial of her adoption 
application from the administrative authorities. The reasoning 
for the refusal included both “the place [her] partner would 
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occupy in the child’s life” and “the lack of a paternal referent” 
in her household.3
Although French law provides that an unmarried person is 
entitled to file an application for adoption, and despite her posi-
tive personal qualities and teaching experience, both the adminis-
trative institutions and the courts rejected Ms. E.B.’s application 
up to the Conseil d’Etat, the highest French administrative court. 
After exhausting all domestic 
remedies, Ms. E.B. submitted a 
petition to the ECtHR claiming 
violations of Articles 8 and 14 
of the ECHR on account of the 
discrimination by the French 
administrative authorities due 
to her declared homosexuality. 
In holding that France had vio-
lated these articles of the ECHR 
in its treatment of Ms. E.B., 
the ECtHR reversed its earlier 
precedent regarding adoption 
by homosexual individuals.
The CaSe laW oF The 
european CourT oF 
human righTS in Same-Sex 
adopTion prior To E.B.
Before the case of E.B., 
the most relevant decision of 
the ECtHR in same-sex adop-
tion pertaining was Fretté v. 
France,4 which concerned a 
man who requested to adopt a child after several unsuccessful 
attempts to have a child with a female friend. French Social 
Services described Mr. Fretté positively, but emphasized that he 
was not ready to organize his new life around a child and the 
related responsibilities. They also noted that he had no one to fill 
the maternal role in his family.5 After exhausting domestic rem-
edies, Mr. Fretté petitioned the ECtHR alleging that France vio-
lated Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 8, and 14 of the ECHR by 
interfering with his family and private life and for discriminating 
against him based on his homosexuality. By a four-to-three vote, 
the ECtHR found no violation of the ECHR.
The court’s decision in Fretté reached no consensus on homo-
sexual individuals’ right to adopt, thereby allowing states a wide 
margin of appreciation – a precedent that would be substantially 
changed in E.B. In Fretté, the ECtHR stated that States Parties 
to the ECHR enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in deciding 
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which differences justify different treatment. This margin of 
appreciation may vary depending on the presence, or absence, of 
a consensus view on a legal issue, such as adoption, in Member 
States. In Fretté, the ECtHR observed that the margin of appre-
ciation for homosexual couples to adopt children was wide due 
to lack of such consensus. As a result, the ECtHR left Member 
States free to decide how to regulate this issue.6 To avoid abuse, 
the ECtHR reserves the right to evaluate conformity of domestic 
decisions to Article 14 of the ECHR.
The court in Fretté found that the French government’s stated 
reasons for the conduct of domestic authorities was justified 
because of converging interests of the applicant to adopt a child, 
and the child’s interest in being adopted. The ECtHR empha-
sized the importance of the affective and emotional relationship 
created through adoption, noting that the interest of the child7 
must be the predominant factor. In Fretté, the French domestic 
court8 noted that the education provided by same-sex parents, 
and the absence of a maternal role model may have negative con-
sequences.9 The ECtHR noted the lack of consensus within the 
scientific debate about these consequences, especially among 
psychiatrists and psychologists.10 The ECtHR also cited deep 
division in national and international public opinion. For these 
reasons, the ECtHR held that a wide margin of appreciation did 
not infringe on the principle of proportionality that the ECHR11 
accords to Member States.
a ConCiSe overvieW oF FrenCh adopTion laW
In E.B. v. France, the ECtHR interpreted the application 
of French laws,12 including Article 343 of the Civil Code,13 
Articles 63 and 100-3 of the Family and Social Welfare Code, 
and Articles 1, 4 and 5 of Decree no. 98-771 of September 1, 
1998, establishing the criteria for evaluating adoption applica-
tions for children in state care.14 These laws affirm that a couple 
married longer than two years and not legally separated, where 
both spouses are over twenty-eight years old, may apply to adopt 
a child.15 Article 343-1 of the Civil Code states that a single 
person over twenty-eight years of age may also apply for adop-
tion.16 In addition, Article 63 of the Family and Social Welfare 
Code17 affirmed that a person who has custody and established 
emotional ties to a child is authorized to adopt the child.18 
Articles 1, 4 and 5 of Decree no. 98-771 provide guidelines for 
adoption.
Based on these domestic guidelines, on February 24, 2000, 
the Administrative Court of Besançon (Administrative Court) 
approved Ms. E.B.’s application.19 The Administrative Court held 
that the Children’s Welfare Service and the Adoption Board’s 
orders denying her application to adopt did not legally justify 
rejection of the application. Because Ms. E.B. was a teacher 
who enjoyed social relationships and showed good familial, edu-
cational, and psychological qualities, the Administrative Court 
determined that she was fit to adopt a child.
However, the public authorities reviewing the adoption 
appealed to the Nancy Administrative Court of Second Instance 
(Nancy Administrative Court), which, in its judgment on 
December 21, 2000, reversed the Administrative Court’s deci-
sion granting custody. The Nancy Administrative Court held that 
Ms. E.B.’s personal situation presented two grounds for rejec-
tion: first, the absence of a male parental role model capable of 
fostering an adopted child’s development,20 and second, the lack 
of sufficient clarity about the place that the applicant’s female 
partner would occupy in the child’s life.21
Ms. E.B. appealed this decision to the highest French admin-
istrative authority, the Conseil d’Etat, which rejected her appeal 
on June 5, 2002, citing the same two justifications as the Nancy 
Administrative Court.22 According to the French administra-
tive judges, the public authorities had to consider Ms. E.B.’s 
sexual orientation when evaluating the needs and interests of 
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 instrument, and is adaptable to moral and social evolution  
in modern times. . . . However, despite Member States’ 
domestic laws on adoption by single individuals, discrimina-
tion based on an applicant’s sexual orientation is not allowed.
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the adopted child. The Conseil d´Etat further held that barring 
Ms. E.B.’s application to adopt did not violate Articles 8 and 14 
of the ECHR or Article 225-1 of the Criminal Code forbidding 
sexual discrimination.23
judgmenT oF The european CourT oF human righTS
The ECHR is a living instrument, and is adaptable to moral 
and social evolution in modern times. Neither the ECHR nor 
ECtHR jurisprudence provides mandatory rules for adoption. 
However, despite Member States’ domestic laws on adoption by 
single individuals, discrimination based on an applicant’s sexual 
orientation is not allowed.
In E.B., the ECtHR affirms an important principle of law: 
because sexual behavior concerns very intimate and personal 
choices, “where sexual orientation is in issue, there is a need for 
particularly convincing and weighty reasons to justify a differ-
ence in treatment regarding rights falling within Article 8 of the 
ECHR.”24 The ECtHR highlights that this case did not concern
an application for authorisation to adopt by a – mar-
ried or unmarried – couple, but by a single person. In 
the Court’s view, that ground might therefore have led 
to an arbitrary refusal and have served as a pretext for 
rejecting the applicant’s application on grounds of her 
homosexuality.25
The ECtHR otherwise found the applicant to have 
“‘undoubted personal qualities and an aptitude for bringing up 
children,’ which were assuredly in the child’s best interests, a key 
notion in the relevant international instruments.”26
Because of the complexity of the case, it is appropriate to 
explain the ECtHR’s concurring and dissenting opinions. The 
ECtHR found a violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR by 
a ten-to-seven vote. The compensation award of €10,000 against 
the French government was approved by an eleven-to-six vote. 
Judge Costa’s dissenting opinion states that there is no explicit 
right to adopt under the ECHR and finds that, while domestic 
authorities may not cite the lack of a “paternal” figure, the 
applicant’s partner’s attitude is a legitimate criterion for refus-
ing adoption.27 Judge Mularoni’s dissenting opinion argues 
that denial based on the absence of a “paternal referent” for the 
adopted child is not a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR.28 
In both domestic and international law, the best interest of the 
child is the paramount consideration for all adoption applicants: 
individuals, couples, homosexuals, and heterosexuals. Judge 
Zupancˇicˇ’s dissenting opinion argued that the applicant should 
have submitted “statistical proof . . . that the French adminis-
trative authorities systematically discriminate against lesbian 
women wishing to adopt a child.”29 Judge Loucaides’s dissent-
ing opinion asserts that sexuality is not a protected status under 
Article 14 of the ECHR.30
Fundamentally, the ECtHR’s decision in E.B. establishes that 
domestic authorities’ evaluation of a married or unmarried indi-
vidual’s application to adopt may not be based on the applicant’s 
sexual orientation.31 The decision is a striking departure from 
the ECtHR’s earlier precedent from Fretté, where reaching a 
consensus opinion on homosexual adoption was inconceivable.
tHe final fRenCH CouRt deCision on tHe E.B. Case
After the decision of the ECtHR in E.B., on April 28, 2008, 
Ms. E.B. once again petitioned to adopt a child. Nevertheless, 
on January 26, 2009, French administrative authorities rejected 
her petition. Ms. E.B. then appealed to the French Equal 
Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission32 (Haute 
Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité 
(HALDE)) on the following grounds: first, that she suffered 
discrimination because of her sexual orientation, despite the 
fact that she clearly met the legal requirements to adopt a child; 
second, that she had informed the Social Services of her same-
sex relationship with Ms. R.; third, that psychological and social 
reports had given a favorable opinion of Ms. E.B.’s adoption 
application.33
The French administrative authority (le Président du Conseil 
général du Jura) argued that Ms. E.B. could not adopt a child, 
citing new reasons, including the significant age difference 
between her, her partner, and the child, as well as her part-
ner’s limited involvement in the adoption proceedings.34 The 
President of the Conseil Général du Jura (Jura General Council) 
found Ms. R.’s alleged lack of interest significant, stating: “As 
a matter of fact, Ms. R. shows low emotional involvement with 
the child and she had a third-party role in the ‘mother-child’ 
relationship.”35
In E.B., the ECtHR affirms an important principle of 
law: because sexual behavior concerns very intimate and 
personal choices, ‘where sexual orientation is in issue, 
there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty 
reasons to justify a difference in treatment regarding 
rights falling within Article 8 of the ECHR.’
29
However, in reviewing the Jura General Council’s deci-
sion, on October 5, 2009, HALDE noted that the Jura General 
Council’s arguments were ill founded, but were not overtly 
discriminatory. HALDE found the presumption that Ms. R. was 
disinterested in the adoption proceeding was unfounded, because 
Ms. R. participated in all interviews during the proceedings.36 
Furthermore, the psychological reports issued by Social Services 
stated that Ms. E.B. and Ms. R. 
were “a really complementary 
couple,” who “express that they 
both want a child.”37
Because Ms. R. was not the 
principal candidate for adop-
tion, her marginal involvement 
in the adoption procedure was 
justified.38 On these facts the 
Administrative Tribunal of 
Besançon erred by evaluat-
ing Ms. E.B. and Ms. R. as if 
they were a heterosexual cou-
ple involved in a civil union 
(PACS)39 or a marriage, and not 
as a single woman who wanted 
to adopt a child with the support 
of her same-sex partner.
Based on this error, French 
authorities demanded the 
involvement of the applicant’s 
lesbian partner because she 
lived with Ms. E.B. and could 
influence the adopted child. The 
HALDE decision compared Ms. E.B.’s application with similar 
adoptions made by single women involved in heterosexual rela-
tionships. HALDE made this comparison to illuminate the dis-
criminatory nature of the Administrative Tribunal of Besançon’s 
argument.40 According to French authorities, the stability 
and strength of the adoptive couple are matters of the utmost 
importance.41
Recent social developments including divorce and France’s 
PACS42 have fostered an epochal change in the traditional idea 
of family. In this context, HALDE held that if the French Civil 
Code recognizes the legal right of individuals to adopt children, 
Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR protect this possibility for all 
individuals.43 While there is no right to adopt a child under the 
ECHR, each application for adoption must be judged in keep-
ing with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. Even if discrimination 
based on sexuality is not explicitly prohibited by the ECHR, the 
ECtHR’s case law specifies that the list of human rights recog-
nized in the ECHR is not exhaustive.44
Nevertheless, the decisions of the French courts at issue in the 
E.B. case seem to be founded only upon her sexual orientation, 
despite psychological and social reports regarding the profes-
sional and personal qualifications of the claimant. For these 
reasons, HALDE stated that the Jura General Council’s decision 
is contaminated by discrimination in violation of Articles 8 and 
14 of the ECHR. These facts led HALDE to overturn the Jura 
General Council’s decision that upheld the denial of Ms. E.B.’s 
adoption petition.45 Ultimately, the Administrative Tribunal of 
Besançon issued a new decision 
that approved Ms. E.B.’s applica-
tion for adoption based on posi-
tive psychological reports.46 Ms. 
E.B. can now adopt a child.
ConCluSionS
The E.B. case confirms 
that the margin of apprecia-
tion afforded to Member States 
in their evaluation of adoption 
applications is limited by the 
requirement of an “objective 
and reasonable justification” 
for refusal.47 Indeed, a refusal 
may not be based on a pro-
spective parent’s sexual orien-
tation. The ultimate domestic 
resolution of the E.B. case 
additionally reveals an interest-
ing and controversial practice: 
the Administrative Tribunal 
of Besançon implemented the 
ECtHR’s judgment based on 
recognition of specific personal 
circumstances related to the applicant, not on the fundamental 
right of non-discrimination. The Administrative Tribunal of 
Besançon did not refer to the ECtHR’s judgment in its legal rea-
soning, but instead relied on HALDE’s decision. Still, HALDE 
specifically cited the ECtHR’s judgment in its own decision. In 
this way, the ECtHR’s decision influenced the final result of the 
French judges, even if it was not part of their legal reasoning.
The ECtHR’s decision in E.B. is of fundamental importance. 
It requires Member States to move past prejudices against adop-
tion applicants based on their sexual orientation, a characteristic 
that is wholly unrelated to an individual’s parenting capabilities. 
Ms. E.B. was successful in her work as an educator of children 
and was recognized as a good teacher by French authorities, 
independent of her sexual orientation. The refusal of her request 
for adoption constituted discrimination based solely on abstract 
categories, directly contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.48 
The ECtHR’s decision in E.B. makes clear that States Parties to 
the ECHR are free, within their margin of appreciation, to pro-
hibit the adoption of children by unmarried people, but may not 
do so based on sexual orientation. HRB
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Endnotes continued on page 78 
Fundamentally, the 
ECtHR’s decision in E.B. 
establishes that, whether 
domestic authorities 
approve an unmarried 
individual’s application to 
adopt, the decision may not 
be based on the applicant’s 
sexual orientation.
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